Don’t lose the legacy: Understanding laches in probate disputes

We are all very aware of the time limit for bringing a claim under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975, which is 6 months from the date of the Grant of Probate. However, if someone wants to challenge the validity of a Will, there is no formal time limit within which a claim must be brought. But this does not mean that a potential claimant can wait indefinitely to bring a claim.

Where a claimant has unreasonably delayed in bringing a claim and that delay has caused unfair prejudice to the opposing party, the claim may be barred.  This is known as the doctrine of laches. While well‑established in equity generally, recent case law has clarified how laches operates specifically within probate litigation, where delay can seriously affect the availability and quality of evidence.

The general doctrine of laches

In Lindsay Petroleum Co v Hurd (1873), Lord Selborne LC set out the classic definition, emphasising that laches is not a technical defence but an equitable one, meaning it operates to prevent injustice. The court is required to assess:

• the length of the delay, and
• the nature of acts done in the interval, particularly whether the defending party has suffered prejudice.

Two key principles arise:

1. Laches may apply if a claimant’s delay amounts to waiver or abandonment of their rights.
2. The consequence of the delay must be that it would be unfair to give relief, usually because the defendant has changed their position because of the delay.

Laches in the probate context

Probate claims have a particular sensitivity to delay, which has the potential to render a claim difficult to prove for lack of reliable evidence, or inequitable to allow due to the way the estate has been dealt with in the interim period.

This is because:

• memories fade;
• witnesses die;
• documents are lost; and
• estates may be distributed.

Recent case law has dealt with how laches interact with probate procedure, especially where a claimant seeks to challenge a will after long periods of inaction. The court looks for an unjustified delay that has caused prejudice or made a fair trial impossible.

James v Scudamore [2023]EWHC 996 (Ch)

This case involved a codicil that benefited the deceased's wife and removed the deceased's son as a beneficiary. The deceased died in 2010, leaving a Will dated 6 March 1998 and a codicil dated 26 December 2002. In 2013, the deceased's son alleged that the codicil was not validly executed; however did not issue a claim until 2020. By this time, the deceased's wife had died, as had one of the attesting witnesses to the codicil. 

The judge invoked the doctrine of laches and ruled that the son was barred from bringing a claim on the basis that there was a lack of evidence that could be relied upon.

The case provided a summary of the key legal principles in the doctrine of laches as follows:

1. If a person or organisation knows that probate proceedings are already underway and that they have the right to be involved, but chooses not to be, they will usually be stuck with the outcome.
2. A reasonable delay, even if the person has accepted a gift under the will, does not usually stop them from later challenging the will.
3. However, an unreasonable delay, especially when combined with actions which suggest that they have given up their right to challenge, will prevent them from bringing a claim.
4. The same applies if the delay has caused others to rely on the situation staying as it is to their detriment, for example, where the estate has already been distributed.

These propositions were subsequently endorsed in the recent cases of Bowerman and Stephenson.

Bowerman v Bowerman [2025]EWHC 2947 (Ch)

In November 2025, the High Court barred a probate claim following 18½ years of unjustified delay. The claimant sought to challenge his father’s 1999 will, which had excluded him, despite having taken legal advice over many years. His explanations for the delay, being a 2006 spinal operation and a restraining order, were rejected as irrelevant, and the court noted that he had expressly said in 2024 that he did not intend to contest the will. The executors relied on that assurance and administered the estate, making the late claim inequitable.

Although the court found that the deceased lacked capacity and did not know and approve the 1999 will, the claimant forfeited any remedy: his prolonged inaction meant the doctrine of laches applied, and a strong underlying claim was lost through delay.

Stephenson & Anor v Daley & Anor [2026]EWHC 53 (Ch)

In this recent decision, the court applied the James v Scudamore principles to reject a will challenge brought 7½ years after the defendants had the information required to challenge its validity.

When determining whether or not to allow the claim and the impact the delay had on the claim, the court highlighted that the following issues arose:

• the death of a key witness (the testator);
• diminished memories of remaining witnesses; and
• loss of solicitors’ records following the closure of their firm.

The court recognised that a probate‑focused version of laches can stop a probate claim entirely. The Judge said, at paragraph [197], that: “Explicable delay, even when coupled with taking a legacy under a will proved in common form, is not generally enough to bar a claimant from taking probate proceedings… But unjustified delay, possibly on its own… and certainly when coupled with acts amounting to waiver of the claimant’s right, will bar the claim… Similarly where the delay has led to others’ detrimental reliance on the inaction, such as distribution of the estate…”.

Conclusion

The law now clearly recognises that laches can bar probate claims where unjustified delay would make it inequitable and practically unjust to grant relief. Courts are willing to apply the doctrine to prevent stale claims, particularly where the delay undermines the evidence necessary to determine a will’s validity. The recent decisions in James v Scudamore, Bowerman, and Stephenson confirm that laches is a powerful, and sometimes determinative, defence in probate litigation.

Charities, therefore, have a difficult balance to strike. On the one hand, charities must handle will‑related concerns with sensitivity, recognising the importance of relationships with donor families, public perception, and reputational trust. On the other hand, unjustified delay in challenging a will can permanently undermine the charity’s ability to recover significant legacy income, especially where evidence degrades, witnesses become unavailable, or estates are distributed. It is therefore important that unnecessary delays are avoided and advice is taken at an early stage, where needed, to minimise the risk of a legacy being lost.