Employment tribunal and court judgments | November 2025
Welcome to our monthly update, where we share recent employment cases of interest and the practical considerations for employers.
Does time always heal? The EAT confirms 'no' when considering 'fairness in dismissal'
Ms O’Brien was dismissed for alleged misconduct involving missed hours and false overtime claims. Although concerns surfaced in 2018, the Trust waited a full year before raising them with her, by which point her PTSD had affected her ability to recall events.
The EAT found the original tribunal hadn’t properly factored in how that delay undermined Ms O’Brien’s ability to defend herself. The fairness decision was overturned and sent back for reconsideration.
The EAT also held that Ms O’Brien’s reasonable adjustments claim may not be out of time after all. The key failure, missing the chance to speak to her promptly, occurred by March 2019, and the tribunal must now reconsider whether it’s just and equitable to extend time.
Delays in dealing with conduct concerns may feel unavoidable, but they can seriously undermine the fairness of any subsequent dismissal. Time can fade memories, limit an employee’s ability to respond, and create procedural vulnerabilities that may be difficult to defend later. Employers should therefore address issues promptly, keep clear records, and ensure that any investigation progresses without unnecessary delay to protect both fairness and legal robustness.
Whistleblowing: employers can be vicariously liable for co-workers who subject employees to a dismissal detriment
Two linked appeals, Rice v Wicked Vision and Barton Turns v Treadwell, required the Court of Appeal to look again at how whistleblowing protections operate. Both employees claimed they were dismissed because of protected disclosures and sought to bring not only automatic unfair dismissal claims under s103A ERA 1996, but also detriment claims under s47B.
The main question turned on the fact that the “detriment” relied upon was the dismissal itself. The question was whether s47B(2), which excludes detriment claims where the detriment “amounts to dismissal”, prevented these complaints from being pursued.
The Court of Appeal reiterated that it was bound by its earlier decision in Timis v Osipov. Although the Court acknowledged it would have reached a different interpretation if free to do so, Osipov remains the governing authority. Under that judgment, detriment claims can proceed where the dismissal is carried out by a colleague, with the employer being liable for that detriment under s47B(1B). As a result, both claimants were permitted to continue with their detriment complaints alongside their unfair dismissal claims.
The Court noted the ongoing inconsistency between tribunal, EAT, and appellate decisions and commented that clarity can only come from the Supreme Court or legislative reform, it remains to be seen if this case will be appealed to the Supreme Court.
It’s important for employers to remember the following:
- A dismissal can still count as a detriment in whistleblowing cases where a colleague is involved in the decision or treatment, meaning an employer can be vicariously liable for a whistleblowing detriment even if the detriment complained of is dismissal.
- Employers may now face dual exposure — both an automatic unfair dismissal claim and a detriment claim based on the same dismissal.
- Senior staff could face personal liability where their actions contribute to the alleged detriment.
- The law in this area remains unsettled, and further clarity will only come from legislative reform or Supreme Court authority.
- HR professionals should review whistleblowing processes to ensure early separation of roles, proper training, and clear safeguards around decision-making. We’re here to help with this at Foot Anstey.
How far do 'proportionate means' actually go?
A married couple with strong evangelical Christian beliefs applied to foster through Manchester City Council. Their application was halted at an early stage after assessors raised concerns about whether they could confidently promote and support diversity, including LGBTQ+ identities. The couple challenged the decision, arguing it breached their rights to religious freedom and expression under the Human Rights Act 1998 and amounted to discrimination under the Equality Act 2010.
The High Court dismissed the claim. Turner J reviewed the statutory duties governing fostering assessments, which require local authorities to prioritise children’s welfare and ensure that prospective carers can meet a wide range of needs.
It was found that whilst the Council’s decision did interfere with the claimant’s Article 9 rights, this was justified as a proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aim of protecting the welfare of potential foster children. There was also no direct discrimination found under the Equality Act 2010 as the Council’s objection was the manner in which the claimants would manifest their beliefs to foster children, not the beliefs themselves.
The Court confirmed:
- It is entirely legitimate for councils to explore applicants’ views on homosexuality and same-sex relationships when those views may influence the care of a child.
- Any impact on the couple’s religious rights was justified because protecting children’s wellbeing is the overriding legal priority.
- Holding particular beliefs is not the issue; the key question is whether expressing or acting on those beliefs could compromise a child’s safety or emotional development.
Although the Equality Act draws a clear distinction between services and public functions and employment rights and regulations, it remains important to understand that an individual’s personal beliefs may, in some circumstances, lawfully be considered relevant to their ability to perform a role—particularly where safeguarding or supporting vulnerable people is involved.
This principle aligns with the recent case of Kristie Higgs v Farmor’s School [2025], which underscored the crucial difference between a belief itself and the manner in which that belief is manifested. The judgment confirmed that it is unlawful to dismiss an employee simply because they hold a protected belief or have expressed that belief, even if others find it offensive. However, where the reason for dismissal or disciplinary action relates not to the belief (or others’ reactions to it) but to the way it was expressed—the manifestation—such action may be lawful only where it can be “objectively justified”.
These cases illustrate the nuanced and technically complex nature of equality and human rights law. If you are an employer or HR professional seeking guidance on how to navigate these issues, we encourage you to read our detailed article here, or contact a member of our Employment Team, who will be happy to assist.