Navigating the Moral Maze – Adult child claims under the 1975 Act.

Over six years ago I explored the concept of the "moral claim" in adult child claims brought under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 ("the 1975 Act") in this article.

At the time, decisions such as Ilott v The Blue Cross and Nahajec v Fowle suggested that whilst adult children enjoyed no automatic right to inherit from their parents, the Court was increasingly willing to look at the reasons behind family estrangement when deciding whether reasonable financial provision had been made.

My concluding observation was that adult child claims were here to stay. Six years later, that prediction appears to have been correct. Adult child claims continue to occupy a significant place in reported 1975 Act claims. Recent authorities demonstrate that the Court remains willing to intervene where the facts reveal something more than mere financial need. In particular, the concept often described as a "moral claim" continues to influence outcomes, even if judges are less inclined to use that terminology expressly. However, the Court is careful to establish that any such claim must be linked to genuine financial need. The mere fact that an adult child considers their exclusion unfair will not be enough.

The moral claim after Ilott

The concept of a moral claim has its roots in Re Coventry [1980], where the Court of Appeal suggested that an adult child generally needs to establish "something more" than financial need when asking the Court to interfere with a parent's testamentary wishes.

Whilst the Supreme Court in Ilott made it clear that a moral obligation is not a prerequisite to a successful claim, the practical reality is that claims by independent adult children often succeed because there are wider circumstances which make their exclusion difficult to justify objectively.

Over the last decade, those circumstances have frequently involved estrangement. The courts have repeatedly examined not simply whether an adult child and parent were estranged, but why the estrangement occurred, who was responsible for it and whether any obligations or responsibilities persisted despite the breakdown in the relationship. That approach can be seen in Ilott, where the Court was sympathetic to the fact that the daughter had not been solely responsible for the breakdown in the relationship with her mother. Similarly, in Nahajec, the claimant's attempts to repair the relationship with her father were a significant feature of the Court's reasoning.

The question is whether this approach has continued.

McDaniel v Talbot

The recent decision in McDaniel v Talbot (2026) provides a useful answer.

Emma McDaniel's father left the family when she was approximately eight months old. There was little or no meaningful relationship throughout most of her life. In 2014, he made a will which expressly excluded Emma and recorded that estrangement as the reason for her exclusion. His estate, worth approximately £1.75 million, was left to his wife.

On one view, this appeared to be a straightforward case of testamentary freedom. The deceased had made his wishes abundantly clear in his will.

However, in February 2019, the deceased re-established contact with Emma. Over the following almost four years, the relationship was rebuilt and, by the Court's assessment, father and daughter became emotionally close. They met regularly, holidayed together and remained in contact until his death in December 2022. The deceased never amended his will to reflect that significant change in circumstances.

Emma's financial circumstances were also compelling. She had health difficulties, limited earning capacity and substantial caring responsibilities for her two disabled children. Ultimately, the Court awarded her approximately £123,000 from the estate, a six-figure sum that is unusual in 1975 Act claims by adult children.

Successful and unsuccessful claims

The significance of McDaniel becomes clearer when contrasted with cases where adult child claims have failed.

In Cockell v Cockell (2025), the claimant was an adult daughter living in Australia whose existence was not known to the deceased's widow and family until after his death. Despite the sympathetic factual background, the Court dismissed her claim and declined to exercise its powers under section 9 of the 1975 Act to treat part of the jointly owned matrimonial home as estate property. Significant weight was placed upon the position of the surviving spouse and the fact that the property had been accumulated during a long marriage.

Unlike McDaniel, there was no history of reconciliation, continuing responsibility or other feature capable of establishing the "something more" discussed in Re Coventry and considered in Ilott. The claimant's biological relationship with the deceased and any financial need she may have had were insufficient to outweigh the competing interests of the widow.

Taken together, McDaniel and Cockell demonstrate that the Court is not engaged in a general redistribution of estates based upon perceived fairness. Financial need remains the starting point, but successful claims continue to involve additional factors such as vulnerability, disability, ongoing responsibilities, reconciliation or circumstances giving rise to a continuing sense of responsibility on the part of the deceased. Where those features are absent, testamentary freedom remains the dominant principle.

Estrangement remains central

An estranged child does not automatically acquire a stronger claim merely because the relationship broke down. Equally, a parent cannot necessarily rely on estrangement as justification for exclusion where the circumstances surrounding that estrangement merit closer scrutiny.

In McDaniel, the Court was clearly influenced by the fact that the deceased had effectively absented himself from his daughter's life for many years before later choosing to rebuild the relationship. The reasons for the estrangement, and the subsequent reconciliation, formed an important part of the wider factual matrix considered by the Court.

This reinforces a theme that has emerged repeatedly in adult child claims over the last decade: the Court is interested in responsibility. Where the evidence demonstrates that the deceased contributed significantly to the breakdown in the relationship, or where the claimant made genuine attempts at reconciliation, the Court may be more willing to conclude that obligations and responsibilities remained notwithstanding the estrangement.

So is the moral claim still alive?

In my view, the answer is yes.

The Court may be less willing to speak expressly about "moral obligations" than it was when Re Coventry was decided, but the underlying concept has not disappeared. It has simply become absorbed into the statutory exercise required by section 3 of the 1975 Act. When judges consider the reasons for estrangement, the conduct of the parties, any continuing obligations and the vulnerability of an applicant, they are often engaging with issues that have an undeniable moral dimension.

The lesson from McDaniel is that financial need will always remain important, but financial need alone rarely tells the whole story. The Court continues to examine family relationships in the round and to consider whether, viewed objectively, the deceased's testamentary wishes have resulted in an unreasonable lack of provision.

Conclusion

Six years ago, I anticipated that adult child claims were here to stay. Recent decisions confirm that remains the case.

Whilst testamentary freedom remains the starting point, McDaniel v Talbot demonstrates that the courts continue to examine the broader family context when assessing reasonable financial provision. Financial need remains essential, but where it is accompanied by vulnerability, reconciliation or evidence of continuing responsibility, the Court may still be prepared to intervene.

Perhaps most importantly, the case demonstrates that the moral claim has not disappeared. Rather than operating as a separate requirement, it has become absorbed into the Court's evaluation of the section 3 factors. The moral maze remains and the courts are still carefully navigating it.