The Mazur judgment: the Court of Appeal clarifies “conduct” cannot be separated from “conduct of litigation”

The Court of Appeal has overturned the High Court’s decision in Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP, reversing the restrictive interpretation previously adopted concerning who may “conduct litigation” under the Legal Services Act 2007.

On 16 September 2025, the High Court (Sheldon J) held that non‑authorised individuals were prohibited from conducting litigation altogether, even when acting under the supervision of an authorised person. The judgment sent shockwaves through the legal profession, raising the alarming prospect that routine delegation practices within law firms might amount to the criminal offence of carrying on a reserved legal activity without authorisation.

The Court of Appeal’s intervention is therefore highly significant. By restoring the longstanding distinction between the conduct of litigation (a reserved activity requiring authorisation) and the supervised assistance of litigation work (a permissible and essential feature of modern legal practice), the judgment brings much‑needed clarity to firms, practitioners, and regulators. Its implications extend well beyond abstract statutory interpretation: it directly affects how litigation teams are structured, how work is delegated to junior lawyers and support staff, and how firms assess and manage regulatory risk in day‑to‑day practice.

The facts of Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP

The case concerns a debt‑recovery claim brought by Charles Russell Speechlys LLP (CRS) to recover more than £50,000 in unpaid legal fees from their former clients, Mrs Julia Mazur and Mr Jerome Stuart. The pair had instructed CRS in 2023 but later refused to settle the outstanding invoices. CRS then instructed Goldsmith Bowers Solicitors (GBS) to pursue the debt. During proceedings, Mrs Mazur and Mr Stuart discovered that Mr Peter Middleton, the head of commercial litigation at GBS, did not hold a valid practising certificate. Since Mr Middleton had been involved in several key steps in the litigation — including advising the clients, taking instructions, drafting the claim form and other documents, and instructing counsel — the defendants applied to the court on the basis that he had unlawfully “conducted litigation,” a reserved legal activity under section 12 of the Legal Services Act 2007.

The Court of Appeal’s decision

The Court of Appeal disagreed with the lower court and held that non‑authorised individuals may carry out litigation‑related tasks, provided they do so on behalf of, and under the supervision of, an authorised lawyer. This restores the long‑understood distinction between conducting litigation — which must be performed by an authorised person — and assisting with litigation under proper supervision, which remains permissible and forms an essential part of modern legal practice.

Sir Colin Briss, delivering the leading judgment, identified three questions to be determined by the Court:

1. Was the judge right to hold that unauthorised persons were “carrying on the conduct of litigation” if they did acts that constituted the conduct of litigation under the supervision of an authorised individual?

2. What acts actually constitute conducting litigation?

3. Was the working model adopted by Law Centres contrary to the 2007 Act?

Issue one: Was the judge right to hold that unauthorised persons were “carrying on the conduct of litigation” if they did acts that constituted the conduct of litigation under the supervision of an authorised individual?

The Court of Appeal held that:

"An unauthorised person may lawfully perform any tasks, which are within the scope of the conduct of litigation, for and on behalf of an authorised individual such as a solicitor or appropriately authorised CILEX member, provided the authorised individual retains responsibility for the tasks delegated to the unauthorised person (both formal responsibility and the responsibilities identified at section 1(3) of the 2007 Act). In that situation, the authorised individual is the person carrying on the conduct of litigation." at paragraph 187 (v) of the judgment.

The Court stressed, however, that delegation to a non‑authorised individual is only permissible where the authorised lawyer exercises proper direction, management, supervision and control over the work being carried out. The degree of supervision required will depend on the circumstances, including the nature of the task, the experience of the individual, and the risks associated with the particular step in the litigation.

Crucial to the Court's determination was the correct statutory interpretation of "carrying on the conduct of litigation" within the context of the Legal Services Act 2007. The Court held that "conduct of litigation" refers to the tasks to be undertaken, and "carry on" refers to the direction and control of, and responsibility for those tasks.

In the High Court's judgment, Sheldon J accepted the distinction submitted by the Law Society and the SRA between a) supporting or assisting an authorised solicitor, and b) conducting litigation under the supervision of an authorised solicitor, the former being compliant and the latter not.  The Court of Appeal rejected this idea, holding that Sheldon J was incorrect to distinguish between the two activities.

The judgment firmly rejects the notion that anyone carrying out a litigation‑related task is, by default, “conducting litigation”. Instead, the Court emphasises that the key question is who ultimately exercises control and accepts responsibility for the case. Where an authorised lawyer supervises the work and retains overall responsibility for the matter, it is that lawyer — not the delegated individual — who is conducting the litigation.

Issue two: What acts actually constitute conducting litigation?

Although the Court recognised that it was petitioned for clarity in relation to what acts or tasks are within "the conduct of litigation" as under the 2007 Act, the Court did not attempt to make an exhaustive definition. However, the Court did provide some useful guidance:

• Routine administrative tasks are not “conduct of litigation”: Activities that are purely clerical or mechanical fall outside the statutory definition.
• Clear examples within scope: The “conduct of litigation” plainly includes issuing proceedings before any court in England and Wales, together with performing any formal ancillary functions connected to those proceedings.
• Areas of uncertainty remain: The precise boundaries of what constitutes “the commencement, prosecution and defence” of proceedings are not fully defined, and the Court declined to provide a comprehensive list.

• Activities likely not to fall within the statutory definition include:
  • Pre‑action or pre‑litigation work
  • Providing legal advice about potential or actual court proceedings
  • Corresponding with the opposing party on a client’s behalf
  • Gathering documents, information, and evidence
  • Instructing or liaising with experts and counsel
  • Signing a statement of truth for a statement of case
  • Signing other documents permitted by the CPR to be signed by a “legal representative” (as defined in CPR 2.3)

Issue three: Was the working model adopted by Law Centres contrary to the 2007 Act?

The Court did not think it was necessary to answer the third issue, specifically as the practice of a group of authorised individuals delegating the conduct of litigation was sufficiently covered in their consideration of the first issue.

Our view

The Court of Appeal’s judgment restores a practical and workable interpretation of the Legal Services Act 2007, confirming that delegation within litigation teams is permitted—provided that an authorised lawyer retains ultimate responsibility and properly supervises the work being carried out.

From a business perspective, this clarification is significant. Effective delegation allows litigation to be conducted more efficiently and more cost‑effectively, reflecting the commercial realities of modern legal practice that the earlier High Court decision failed to acknowledge. By bringing the law back into step with day‑to‑day practice, the Court of Appeal has reduced the legal uncertainty that had arisen and enabled firms and businesses to structure their teams with confidence.

Importantly, the Court of Appeal has not displaced the existing regulatory guidance. The guidance issued by the Law Society, the Solicitors Regulation Authority and CILEX following the High Court’s ruling remains relevant. Ensuring that appropriate supervision arrangements are in place — particularly for activities at the higher end of risk or complexity — is essential for ongoing compliance.

Overall, the Court of Appeal’s approach recognises how litigation is delivered: through teams, through structured delegation, and under the oversight of those authorised to conduct litigation. The decision restores clarity for practitioners and reassurance for clients by confirming that supervised delegation is both lawful and integral to efficient dispute resolution.