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My previous article looked at the development of the Contingent Reimbursement Model (CRM) code, its purpose in dealing with Authorised Push Payment Fraud (APP) and the principles underpinning the scheme.
In this second piece I want to explore the standards it sets for those payment service providers (PSPs) who have committed to the code and how those standards may affect the landscape for all PSPs when they respond to APP fraud.
The CRM code breaks down participants' obligations into two parts – general expectations and the standards for firms.
The general expectations provide a baseline of expected behaviours on the part of the participant PSPs. For instance, the code emphasises the importance of education and awareness as a responsible activity for PSPs to undertake. Further, it requires that the PSPs will collect statistics and measure impacts on the incidents of APP fraud.
Many PSPs highlight to their customers the developing threats and ways they can protect themselves. For those PSPs that have undertaken such a practice, it has enabled them to justify refusing to reimburse customers who have not taken due care when making payments.
However, PSPs have been doing so in the absence of any accepted “industry standard”. For the first time, the standards offer a baseline which will inevitably be considered by any competent authority (e.g. the FOS or a court) when faced with questions of whether the PSP has acted properly.
The standards are more instructive than the general expectations and could soon be regarded as a minimum best practice. Where a PSP fails to meet the standards it risks bearing the cost of reimbursing customers even if the customer could be regarded as to blame:
"If Firms fail to meet these standards, they may be responsible for meeting the cost of reimbursing, in accordance with R1, a Customer who has fallen victim to an APP scam."
For each payment journey (i.e. the process of bringing about an authorised payment, ending with the initial reception of the transaction funds in a payee account and the steps in between), the standards are split between those applicable to the sending PSP and the receiving PSP.
The code expects that sending PSPs will:
The code's standards also expect receiving PSPs to:
Overall, the standards codify processes that have differed between PSPs whilst giving some flexibility as to application – for instance depending on the risk profile of the PSPs' customers, transactions and business.
That flexibility offers opportunity and risk:
Most notably, for the first time, the code provides that a receiving PSP’s breach of their overarching regulatory duty (e.g. to adhere to money laundering regulations) can give rise to a direct remedy for victims of fraud.
Therefore, it can be expected that all victims will make use of this right. For example, as a matter of default, why would a victim not exercise their rights under the expanded jurisdiction of the FOS – in the hope of capturing failures by the receiving PSP who banks a fraudster’s mule accounts?
PSPs signed up to the code should consider the level of risk they are willing to tolerate and calibrate their policy and practice accordingly. These should reflect the differing obligations on sending and receiving PSPs.
In particular, where a receiving PSP has been targeted as useful channel to divert the stolen funds, it cannot expect to simply redirect complaints to the paying PSP.
PSPs who do not commit to the code should nevertheless familiarise themselves with the obligations and assess the impact to their business – particularly if the code were to become universally recognised by the FOS as industry standard.
As we'll see in my next article on how reimbursement functions under the code, getting this right will be important both for ensuring customers are reimbursed appropriately and also – perhaps more importantly – deciding who will need to foot the bill for compensating victims of APP fraud.
For more information or help with the Contingent Reimbursement Model code or debt finance more generally, please get in touch by email on [email protected], or via our contact page.